dissertation information

 
Phenomenal Consciousness as Scientific Phenomenon?
A Critical Investigation of the New Science of Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness poses something of a puzzle for philosophy of science. This puzzle arises from two facts: It is common for philosophers (and some scientists) to take its existence to be phenomenologically obvious and yet modern science arguably has little (if anything) to tell us about it. And, this is despite over 20 years of work targeting phenomenal consciousness in what has been termed the new science of consciousness. What is it about this supposedly evident phenomenon that has kept it beyond the reach of our scientific understanding? I argue that phenomenal consciousness has resisted scientific explanation because there is no such phenomenon: What is in fact phenomenologically obvious has not resisted scientific explanation, exposing phenomenal consciousness as an unneeded and unwarranted theoretical construct that is not supported by the scientific evidence. I show this through an investigation of the new science. I detail how these researchers understand "phenomenal consciousness," tie this understanding to the recent philosophical debates, and critically assess the reasons given for believing that such a scientific phenomenon exists.

 
Committee:

Edouard Machery (co-director)
University of Pittsburgh, Department of History and Philosophy of Science

Ken Schaffner (co-director)
University of Pittsburgh, Department of History and Philosophy of Science

Peter Machamer
University of Pittsburgh, Department of History and Philosophy of Science

Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh, Department of Philosophy

Jesse Prinz
City University of New York, Graduate Center

 
 Chapter Summaries

 Introduction: The Problem of Consciousness for Philosophy of Science

  Writing Sample (stand-alone version of Chapter 6):
 "Searching for Evidence of Phenomenal Consciousness in NCC Research"

Abstract: Recent scientific work aiming to give a neurobiological explanation of phenomenal consciousness has largely focused on finding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The hope is that by locating neural correlates of phenomenally conscious mental states, some light will be cast on how the brain is able to give rise to such states. In this paper I argue that NCC research is unable to produce evidence of such neural correlates. I do this by considering two alternative interpretations of NCC research—an eliminativist and a disjunctivist interpretation. I show that each of these interpretations is compatible with the scientific data and yet is more parsimonious than accounts involving the supposed phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness.

 
Table of Contents:

        0. The Problem of Consciousness for Philosophy of Science

            0.1 Is phenomenal consciousness obvious or does its existence
                  need to be established?
            0.2 Dissertation Plan

        1. The New Science of Consciousness

            1.1 The New in the New Science
            1.2 The Scientific Version of the Hard Problem
            1.3 The Center of the New Science
            1.4 The Fringe of the New Science
            1.5 Conclusion

        2. Qualia in Philosophy and the New Science

            2.1 Philosophical Disputes over Qualia
            2.2 Qualia as Beyond Dispute
            2.3 Qualia in the New Science
            2.4 Qualia Characterize a Broad Range of Mental States
            2.5 Conclusion

        3. A Challenge for the New Science

            3.1 Data and Phenomena
            3.2 First-person Data
            3.3 Framing the Challenge
            3.4 An Alternative Interpretation
            3.5 Conclusion

        4. Phenomenal Consciousness is not Phenomenologically Obvious

            4.1 Phenomenological Obviousness and the Naive View of Ordinary
                  Perception
            4.2 Historical Support for the Prevalence of the Naive View
            4.3 Empirical Support for the Prevalence of the Naive View
            4.4 Transparency and the Naive View
            4.5 Conclusion

        5. Two Arguments for the existence of Phenomenal Consciousness

            5.1 Argument 1: Acquaintance with Sensory Qualities in Unordinary
                  Perception
            5.2 Response: Denying Acquaintance in Unordinary Perception
            5.3 Argument 2: The Scientific Account of Sensory Qualities
            5.4 Response: The Scientific Account no more supports the New Science
            5.5 Conclusion

        6. Searching for Evidence of Phenomenal Consciousness in NCC Research

            6.1 Introduction
            6.2 Data and Phenomena in NCC Research
            6.3 The Eliminativist take on NCC Experiments
            6.4 Further Support for the New Science Interpretation
            6.5 The Disjunctivist Take on NCC Experiments
            6.6 Further, Further Support for the New Science Interpretation
            6.7 Conclusion